



Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Slovenia

D3.1 Country Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This report presents a brief overview of (de-)radicalisation events, stakeholders and agents in Slovenia, a secure EU country with low crime rates and almost no terrorist-related activity. Nevertheless, Slovenia follows EU counter-terrorist directives and puts effort into establishing the local RAN-system. Slovenian political elites often resort to demonizing Muslims as terrorists, both in relation to the existing Islamic minority in Slovenia and to (future possible) immigrants, although the numbers of both groups are miniscule. The biggest fear mongers in politics and media are discussed, as are some cases of hate speech, incitement to violence and violent attacks against minorities. Due to historical curtailing of freedom of expression the Slovenian judiciary rarely sanctions agents of hate speech, ignoring the arguments of progressive scholars for stricter legislation. In light of this, it is emphasised that hate crime incidents in Slovenia, in the form of violent attacks directed towards minorities, even resulting in deaths, have not been perceived as acts of terrorism by nor the police, politics, judiciary or the general public. In terms of de-radicalisation, this report emphasises the lack of a sustainable national prevention programme and draws attention to progressive projects of monitoring intolerance, hate speech and human rights violations.

1. Introduction

This report presents a general overview of radicalisation agents and events, as well as de-radicalisation stakeholders and programmes in Slovenia in the new millennium. Keeping in mind the semantic and political nuances and criticisms of the concepts of terrorism, radicalisation and extremism (e.g. Jackson 2007; Kundani 2012; Radoš 2020), we present a general overview of Slovenia's track record in the field of stirring and curbing radicalisation. What we mean by *radicalisation* is a process by which individuals and groups try to reject established law, order, and democratic politics in order to actively pursue alternatives in the form of politically driven violence and justification of violence. We propose hate speech cases as important indicators of such tendencies in Slovenia, while acknowledging other indicators noted in literature and by social agents. By *de-radicalisation* we understand both the process of de-radicalisation, which reverses the existing radicalisation, and the process of counter-radicalisation, which prevents radicalisation from happening in the first place. Although these de-radicalisation processes can, in theory, happen on individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels, we argue that Slovenia seems to employ de-radicalisation programmes merely on the macro level. However, sustainability cannot be regarded as their strong suit just yet.

Relying on secondary sources such as academic research, official statistics, think tank reports and media reports, this report detects indicators and actual instances of radicalisation and extreme violence that are mostly right-wing, xenophobic and ethno-nationalist in nature, while also noting indicators, promoted mostly by the Slovenian police and mainstream security scholars of possible religiously inspired radicalisation. Although terrorism in the current hegemonic meaning of the word has been non-existent in Slovenia for decades, there have been cases of radicalisation that one should pay very close attention to. Hence, the most relevant cases of radical(isation) threats to the security of Slovenian residents, will be presented here, including physical attacks on minorities, xenophobic hate speech and anti-refugee attitudes. In addition to the overview of the agents of radicalisation and relevant cases, de-radicalisation research projects, anti-terrorist regional collaboration and anti-hate speech programmes will be presented.

2. Contextual background

A Eurozone country encompassed by Western Europe and the Balkans with a population of 2 million, Slovenia was part of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918, when it became part of the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After resisting and defeating the Axis forces during WWII, Yugoslav peoples adopted a milder form of socialist governance and a one-party system. In 1991, after a short 10-day war, Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, and joined the EU and NATO in 2004. Furthermore, it joined the Schengen area in 2007, and the OECD in 2010. Apart from the short armed conflict with the Yugoslav People's Army in 1991, the country has been peaceful since the end of WWII. It boasts with one of the lowest respective rates in homicide, major assault, rape and kidnapping in the EU (see Vuga Bernšak & Prezelj, 2020, p. 67, footnote 2; Eurostat, 2020). Despite its social, political and cultural connections with the Balkans, Slovenia differs from the other ex-Yugoslav countries significantly. Since it managed to avoid ethnic and religious conflicts in the 1990s, Slovenia has no significant presence in international humanitarian and security organisations or NATO

forces. After 2004, through its role and influence, the EU increased and set in motion a process of 'Europeanisation' (Novak and Fink-Hafner 2019, p. 4), with Slovenia rapidly adopting Western democratic and capitalist standards. For the longest time, it has had the most developed economy in the ex-Yugoslav region and a strong middle class (*ibid.*, pp. 2-3). Never a coloniser nor violently colonised, Slovenia's population is relatively homogeneous both ethnically (83% Slovenian) and religiously (69% Roman-Catholics). Slovenia's constitution and legislation privileges ethnic Slovenes rather than Slovenian citizens. The Preamble to the Constitution states that "we Slovenes have established our national identity and asserted our statehood" (Constitution 1991), while Article 5 assures that "Slovenes not holding Slovene citizenship may enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia" (*ibid.*). Slovenia's citizenship has therefore been defined according to the principle of *ius sanguinis* (Zorn 2005, 136; Bajt 2010), i.e. in accordance with ethnic bloodline principle rather than a territorial one, based on either birth (*ius soli*) or residence (*ius domicilii*). Consequently, ethnic Slovenians obtain citizenship automatically while others are denied this privilege.

Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system and its governments are coalitions of small political parties (*ibid.*, p. 9), mostly with a centrist-left-liberal leaning PM. Since 1991, socialist discourse in mainstream media was rather successfully replaced by patriotic, nationalistic and traditionalistic "differentiation from everything that symbolized socialism, communism, or the Balkans" (Vezovnik, 2013, p. 610). Nevertheless, the right-wing anti-communist rhetoric emphasises the alleged grip that corrupt informal power groups of socialist 'old boys' have over the country (see Grodeland, 2007; Žerdin, 2012; Novak & Fink-Hafner 2019, p. 9). Repositioning Slovenian identity as strictly 'European' rather than 'Balkan', populist right-wing parties invented communists as new eternal enemies, while also demonizing minorities (Rizman, 1999). One of the first culminations of such attitudes was the government's illegal "erasure" of approx. 25,000 inhabitants of Slovenia in February 1992 (over 1% of the population), who were predominantly members of ex-Yugoslav and Roma minorities, stripping them of all basic rights through the undisclosed and unlawful removal from the register of permanent residents (Dedić et al., 2003; Vezovnik, 2013). According to the last Census (2002a), 17 percent of the population were ethnic minorities, including 120,000 ex-Yugoslav minorities (39,000 Serbs, 36,000 Croats, 32,000 Bosniaks/Muslims, 6,000 Albanians, 4,000 Macedonians, 3,000 Montenegrins), 6,000 Hungarians, 3,000 Roma,¹ and 2,000 Italians.

In terms of religion, the Census (2002b) lists 69.1% of the population as Catholic, 1.1% Evangelical, 0.6% Orthodox Christian and 0.6% Muslim. From 1991 to 2002, the number of self-proclaimed Catholics decreased, as did the share of Catholic believers in relation to all believers, while the number of self-proclaimed Muslim believers increased, as did the share of Muslim believers. Namely, in 1991, Catholics held a 71.6 percent share and Muslims held a 1.5 percent share of believers, while in 2002, the share of Catholics decreased to 57.8 percent and the share of Muslims increased to 2.4 percent (Dragoš, 2005, p. 307). The tiny Muslim minority in Slovenia originates from Bosnia and is regarded as moderate (Prezelj & Kocjančič, 2020, p. 31). Muslim migrants from non-European countries are not likely to remain

¹ Roma frequently do not report their nationality accurately to census takers, and Amnesty International estimated that the true number of Roma was 7,000 to 12,000 (US Dept. of State 2007).

in Slovenia, which has traditionally never been in conflict with a Muslim country, although it is dispatching its soldiers to Middle East NATO missions (ibid.).

With regards to minorities, the constitution privileges the 'traditional' 'autochthonous' ('indigenous') Italian and Hungarian minorities, guaranteeing them one respective member of parliament (MP) each. No comparable special provisions or rights are reserved for other minorities. The Constitution (Article 65) and a special law provide specific provisions relating to the Roma minority (Državni zbor, 2007), which for instance guarantees one council representative in municipalities where Roma are considered 'autochthonous' ('indigenous'). Neither relevant minority rights nor minority political representation are granted to ex-Yugoslav or any other minorities, although these do enjoy all civil rights and liberties afforded to Slovenian citizens (see US Department of State, 2007 and 2020).

In terms of immigration, Slovenia is a chosen destination for employment and family reunification reasons (Bajt 2009). Most foreigner work permits are issued to citizens of ex-Yugoslav states (Ministry of the Interior 2019). Asylum seekers have been relatively uncommon, while granted asylum applications have been even less common. Although one can detect periods of increased numbers of applicants (i.e. 2003-2005 and 2016-2019) in official governmental data (Statistični urad, 2020), the number of granted asylum applications remains consistent throughout. On average, there were 967 asylum applications and 48 granted applications per year from 2002 to 2019, resulting in an average of 7% of such applications granted each year. In the year 2019, there were 680 persons in Slovenia with the internationally recognised protected status, plus 311 asylum-seekers and 97 persons who waited to file an application (Bajt, 2019, p. 313) – altogether approximately 1,000 asylum seekers in a nation of two million. However, moral panic and xenophobia have been common public reactions to migrants, particularly during the 1990 Balkan wars, as well as during the years 2001, 2015 and 2016 (see Jalušič, 2002; Bajt 2016). In 2015, Slovenia was one of the countries that created a humanitarian transit 'corridor' from Greece to Austria and opened its borders to migrants. Around 450,000 migrants entered Slovenia and also exited - on foot. However, the government's presumably humanitarian approach in the summer turned towards *crimmigration* (Bajt, 2018, pp. 305-306) in November, i.e. securitization, surveillance and militarization of migration, including the construction of razor-wire fences along the Slovenian-Croatian border (Bajt, 2019, pp. 311-312), where they still remain today. Since then, migrants have increasingly been constructed discursively as symbolic assailants who are to be feared (Bajt, 2018, pp.308-309).

In Slovenia, there are around 3,000 Catholic churches for 1,135,626 Catholics (Census 2002b), that is approximately 378 Catholics per church. To ensure the same ratio for Slovenia's 47,488 Muslims, according to Dragoš (2005, p. 299), 125 religious buildings would have to be made available to them. However, they have had none up until 2019, when the first mosque in Slovenia gained all the necessary permissions to open. Ripe with anti-Muslim prejudice, Slovenia lacks "knowledge of Islam, while the factual contact and experience remains almost non-existent" (Bajt, 2016, p. 53). However, both Slovenian Muslims and ethnic Slovenians consider themselves to be South Slavs, as both have lived in the same country for at least 80 years and speak similar Slavic languages. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and "refugee crises" could arguably have influenced the presence of Islamophobia in Slovenia. However, its presence might also be a result of endemic historic phenomena such as (1) the 50-year old opposition to the construction of a mosque in Ljubljana (Dragoš, 2005, p. 312) and (2) the

obvious xenophobia with the use of pejorative designators such as 'Southerners', directed towards Bosnian Muslim immigrants in socialist times (see Mežnarič, 1986; Bajt, 2016, p. 53; Pajnik, 2019, p. 23), as well as (3) the historical fear of and prejudice against the Ottoman Turks, being regarded as barbarian invaders (see Bartulovič, 2010; Žigon, 2013).

The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) has arguably increased security concerns among political elites in Slovenia and the Balkans as a region has become considered a radicalisation threat. Approximately 10 people from Slovenia, being recruited through Bosnia, have fought for ISIS (Prezelj & Kocjančič, 2020, p. 34; see also Mekina, 2014). Around 1,000 other persons from the Balkan region travelled to Syrian conflict areas between 2012 and 2016 (Azinovič, 2017, p. 9; Prisljan et al., 2018, p. 260). Keeping in mind that around 5,000 individuals from the EU migrated to Syria, Iraq and Iran during that period (see Lobnikar et al., 2019, p. 29), Azinovič (2017) argues that the Balkans produce a smaller percentage of 'foreign fighters' than other European countries with significant Muslim minorities. Although Lobnikar *et al.* (*ibid.*) and Prisljan *et al.* (2018, p. 260) warn of an expected return of a significant number of Balkan 'foreign fighters', Azinovič (2017, p. 11) anticipates they will remain in the Middle East – unless another uncontrolled wave of migrants along the 'Balkan route' obscures returnees, "their return to the region *en masse* seems rather far-fetched" (Azinovič, 2017, p. 11).

3. Structures of radicalisation

According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2021), there have been no terrorist incidents in Slovenia in the last 20 years.² The Global Terrorist Index for Slovenia has been zero from 2013 to 2020 (see GTI, 2021). National security scholars Prezelj and Kocjančič (2020) describe Slovenia as a country without a single successful terrorist attack and "no officially recognised terrorist group (...) actively working against the country" (*ibid.*, p. 29). Indeed, terrorism, provided it is understood in current hegemonic terms, has been absent in Slovenia.³ However, there have been instances of violent attacks against members of minorities, which we will indicate specifically and could arguably be characterised as violent

² The last terrorist incident on Slovenian soil took place in 2000, according to GTI (2021). GTI mentions Slovenia in relation to 10 terrorist incidents, seven of which happened in Slovenia, including a bomb explosion on a train in 1977 when Slovenia was part of SFR Yugoslavia, and six other cases. Namely, in 1994, 1 Czech tourist was killed, and his partner injured in a firearm attack at the Studenec highway rest area (case is still unsolved; see Marin 2021). In 1996, a judge's wife was injured in an explosion at their home in Maribor (the attacker was sentenced to 12 years in prison; their motive was related to the judge's professional work; see Delo 2019). However, there were at least three other violent attacks against judges in relation to their work between 1991 and 2020 (see *ibid.*), yet they were not featured in GTD. According to GTD, in 1996, there was an explosion in a bar in Maribor, as well as at the headquarters of a local political party called Republican party (Republikanska stranka) in Velenje, but no persons were harmed. In 1997, no one was killed or injured in an explosion at a Defence Ministry property, while in 2000, "unknown perpetrators fired several shots at the Defence Ministry building (...), but no one was hurt" (GTD 2021). The remaining incidents related to Slovenia in one way or another, took place in foreign countries. Namely, in Austria in 1994, when 3 persons were injured in a pipe bomb explosion at an Austrian-Slovenian school in Klagenfurt; in Pakistan in 2002 when 1 Slovenian, 7 Germans, 1 Austrian, 2 Pakistani children and 1 local security guard were among the injured in a grenade attack in Mansehra; and in Kosovo in 2005, when a bomb placed in a container in front of the *Slovenia Spot House* in Priština exploded and damaged the car of the President of Kosovo.

³ See Appendix 1 for main (de-)radicalisation events in Slovenia.

extremist attacks at least, if not terrorist attacks, yet they have not been perceived by the police, courts, politicians, media or the general public as such.

The data from Europol definitely supports the claim that Slovenia has not experienced any terrorist attacks in recent years. Prezelj and Kocjančič's overview of Europol's Te-Sat reports between 2007 and 2019 (*ibid.*, 29) and of our own analysis of several of these reports, including the last one (Europol, 2020), suggests that Slovenia has not been mentioned in the Te-Sat reports frequently. On the contrary, it seems to be one of the countries least threatened by terrorist activities, as defined by Europol, to the extent that in some reports it was not mentioned at all (e. g. Europol, 2012 and 2013).

Additionally, Slovenia's national security resolutions do not list terrorist threats as major concerns (Prezelj & Kocjančič, 2020, pp. 29-30). In the early 1990s, the largest threat was perceived to originate from the ex-Yugoslav war region and its states' retaliatory military ambitions (see Security Resolution, 1993), while in the new millennium the threats seem to be greatly dispersed and non-military, ranging from climate change to Russia-related threats and random terrorist acts (see Security Resolution, 2001; 2010; 2019). Since levels of violent crime tend to be very low in Slovenia, the general public does not seem to perceive terrorism as a major concern either. Accordingly, public opinion polls conducted by the University of Ljubljana before and after the 9/11 attacks showed that the Slovenian public regarded terrorism as tiny a threat to their wellbeing as another country's military attack on Slovenia (Prezelj & Kocjančič, 2020, p. 30-31). Nevertheless, let us join Prezelj and Kocjančič (2020, p. 31) in listing some of the Slovenian cases mentioned in Europol's Te-Sat reports. Slovenia is listed, together with Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Finland, as a potential logistical base for Islamist terrorists, as well as a transit country for terrorists trying to enter the EU, along with Romania and Estonia (see Europol, 2008). In relation to migrations of 'foreign fighters' Slovenia is described, together with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, BiH, Serbia, Bulgaria, Italy and Greece, as a transition point on a popular route for fighters travelling from the EU to Turkey (see Europol, 2014 and 2015). Along with Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, Slovenia was reported as a home to one of the Sharia 4 movement branches (*ibid.*). The arrest of two terrorist suspects in 2018 and two court verdicts from 2015 and 2016 were listed as relevant (see Europol, 2019), as well as a trend of converting individuals from the Roma community to radical Islam (see Europol, 2017; 2018; 2019), although it was believed that their conversion was motivated by cash gains rather than genuine persuasion (Prezelj & Kocjančič, 2010, p. 31).

Acknowledging potential security threats by vigilante groups, the latest Europol (2020) Te-Sat describes Slovenia, along with Belgium and France, as a state where the emergence was detected of "paramilitary groups pretexting the impotence of the state to protect the population against the perceived threat from Islam and immigration" (*ibid.*, p. 18). It is reported that "in the light of increased illegal border crossings, the polarisation of society with regard to support or rejection of migration has led to a more frequent emergence of 'neighbourhood watches'" (*ibid.*, p. 69). These self-organised groups were successful in recruiting members via social media and in creating echo chambers "that can lead to radicalisation and justification of violence" (*ibid.*, p. 69). Describing the Slovenian state's immigration policy as insufficient in protecting the majoritarian population against migrants, these "groups have a unified command, pursue similar goals, provide training in army techniques, have unified insignias and conduct outreach activities to the public and specific target groups" (*ibid.*).

In Slovenian political and media discourse, ‘neighbourhood watches’ are rarely perceived as (potential) domestic terrorist groups, nor are there connections made between these anti-migrant groups and similar vigilante groups from the past, for example, the lynch mob in 2006, which for several weeks “protected” the local population against members of a Roma family by preventing their return to their settlement and eventually, under state sponsorship, forced them to resettle elsewhere (see MMC, 2006; US Department of State, 2007; Vezjak, 2008a, pp. 58-59).

Slovenian vigilante groups have arguably been a direct result of inflammatory rhetoric of certain right-wing political actors, presenting migrants and various minorities, including the Erased, Muslims and LGBTQ+, as direct threats to safety and wellbeing of “normal” Slovenians. Although populism is not exclusive to the right-wing parties in Slovenia, hate speech and politics of fear is (Pajnik, 2019, p. 26).

Up until the 2008 elections, the political party system in Slovenia was considered very stable, as only one new party (or even none in 2004) per election managed to cross the parliamentary threshold, while remaining under the 10% vote share (Malčič & Krašovec, 2019, p. 116). After the 2008 elections, new political parties gained more influence and power and the whole system became much more volatile (ibid., 122). Nevertheless, in terms of ideological orientation, the political system remained rather stable. Specifically, the Slovenian parliament has for instance never featured an elected radical left-wing political party that would promote a violent revolution or the construction of a (one-party) socialist political system through undemocratic means. Although most political players and the media have recently treated the Levica party (meaning literally ‘The Left’) and its former incarnations Initiative for Democratic Socialism (IDS) and the United Left (UL), both founded in 2014, as left-wing extremists, it is obvious that neither their actions nor programmes distinguish them from 20th century social-democratic parties, as Dragoš (2018, p. 108, footnote 1) points out.

However, since a parliamentary party named the Social Democrats already exists, it is often implied that The Left is a radical left-wing party. Ironically, the Social Democrats are actually the successors of the League of Communists of Slovenia, which after the dissolution of a socialist Yugoslavia gradually rebranded itself as a ‘third way’ party, embracing the neoliberal agenda wholeheartedly (ibid.). Hence, the Social Democrats are a party of *extreme centre* (Ali 2015) rather than what is implied by their name, and the Left is actually a classic social democratic party. Ideologically, all other parliamentary parties in Slovenia in the last 20 years have belonged to (extreme) centre, either as liberal neoliberals, conservative neoliberals or a mixture of both, with the exception of Janez Janša’s nationalistic far-right Slovenian Democratic Party (SDP) and Zmago Jelinčič’s xenophobic far-right Slovenian National Party (SNP). Being led for three decades by the same respective leader, the two-party presidents and various political and media actors related to them are also responsible for the majority of ‘hate speech’ and ‘fear mongering’ cases in Slovenia.

However, judging by most pre-election manifestos rather than social and traditional media party discourse, most parliamentary parties, even arguably SDP and SNP, seem rather centrist. With regards to security issues, for instance, in election campaign programmes, terrorist attacks are considered a threat by some parliamentary parties (see SDP, 2004; 2008; SD, 2008; NSi, 2018; DePP, 2018; MCP, 2018), while many more are concerned about

migrations (“illegal” and “economic”) and promise control thereof (see SDP, 2004; 2008; SNP, 2005; 2016; LDS, 2011; SPP, 2015; NSi, 2018; SD, 2008; 2018; 2019; MCP 2018). The right-leaning parliamentary party election programmes sometimes emphasise the dangers posed by certain social groups, but not as much as their (social) media propaganda. For example, they deem migrants and refugees as a security and national identity threat (NSi, 2018; SNP, 2005; 2016; NSi, 2018). However, they tend to be rather abstract in implying that a problematic *extreme left* is present in Slovenia (see SDP, 2004; 2008; NSi, 2018), while the *extreme right* is never even mentioned, let alone criticised.

In the left-leaning pre-election manifestos, we have not noticed specific social groups appearing as perceived violent threats. For instance, although the neo-Nazi and neofascist groups have been perceived as violent threats by the Left party in their press releases (see UL, 2014a; Levica, 2018a), these groups were absent from their pre-election manifestos (see UL, 2014b; Levica, 2018b). Additionally, while Social Democrat manifestos perceive terrorism, radicalisation and extremism as violent threats in general (see SD, 2018; 2019), they do not mention particular agents. However, an emphasis on combating hate speech in some left-leaning parliamentary party manifestos is present nonetheless (see LDS, 2011; PAB, 2014; SD, 2018).

This does not seem to be unusual, as compared to the almost complete absence of terrorism and extreme violence, hate speech is arguably the biggest indicator of radicalisation in the country. However, hate speech is rarely prosecuted, as the Prosecutor’s Office has regularly chosen a path of maximum tolerance corresponding to the North American concept of freedom of speech rather than limiting extreme and hateful expression.

With Slovenia’s legacy of being a socialist republic in the former Yugoslavia, this is somewhat understandable, since the collective memory of the once infamous Article 133 still haunts the understanding of what constitutes free speech. Namely, better known as “verbal delict”, this article used to thwart freedom of speech in Yugoslavia. However, enabling the right to express one’s political views freely in public is far from at odds with also guarding the humanity of minorities and prosecuting discrimination. Yet this seems to be what predominantly informs the current fear in Slovenia of allegations of the infringement of free speech. (Bajt 2016, 58)

Bajt (ibid.) continues to argue that calls for the killing of refugees and similar hate speech should therefore be publicly rejected and prosecuted before they turn into hate crimes. But this is still not the case, even though many more arguments in favour of prosecution of hate speech have been presented over the years, both in academic milieu (see Moti & Bajt, 2016; Splichal, 2017) and in progressive blogosphere (In Media Res, 2021; Sovraštvo, 2021).

Indicative of tolerance towards hate speech, is also significant lack of condemnation from the long-time president of Slovenia, Borut Pahor – a former PM, president of the Social Democrats, and member of the League of Communists – as well as from most of the central political parties and all the right-wing parties. The message these politicians are sending seems to bewilder the general public. Dragoš (2018, p. 125-128) argues that public opinion in Slovenia is experiencing a particular type of radicalisation due to the increasing distance between people’s expectations and actual political decisions. Namely, despite one of the

smallest inequalities between rich and poor in Europe and several other positive economic and social trends, academic research polls indicate that 64% of the public, compared to the EU average of 25%, is dissatisfied with democracy and the current political system (see also Malčič & Krašovec, 2019), and that the majority would prefer a strong leader that would repair the current situation.

The main characteristics of the social context that explains this state of affairs are the prolonged and openly expressed division between – on one hand – people’s expectations, which are socially rather egalitarian and politically oriented to the left (socialist), and – on the other hand – the actions of the political elites who have applied neoliberal strategies of development. (Dragoš, 2018, p. 127)

In March 2020, two years after Dragoš’s analysis, a more authoritative leader - namely, Janez Janša, an “eternal” president of the far-right SDP – indeed became Slovenia’s new prime minister. Hate speech cases once again increased severely (see Vežjak, 2021).

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

In this chapter, we will focus on collective agents in the form of political parties, networks, media companies etc., that have been responsible for the most incidents of hate speech in Slovenia. We will also briefly describe some of the agents responsible for organised violent attacks on minorities in recent years.

Firstly, we touch on the subject of Janez Janša, his far-right SDP, and the individuals and organisations that SDP is connected with. Established in 1989, SDP has been led by Janša since 1993. Generally considered the largest opposition party in Slovenia, SDP was also a leading member of governing coalitions in the periods of 2004-2008 and 2012-2013, as well as since March 2020 up until today. Janša, a three-time PM, former communist turned stark anti-communist, has arguably been the single most popular politician in Slovenia since its independence. Under his leadership, SDP has become a popular far-right party with an extreme youth faction and numerous vaguely connected media and xenophobic organisations. In recent years, Janša’s obsessive and toxic tweets earned him the nickname “Twitler”. Boasting 82,000 followers, he was the only leader of a country who, before the votes were counted, tweeted a congratulating message directed at Donald Trump on his non-existing second presidential win (see Palmer, 2020). His tweets are “often full of sarcasm and denunciations of political opponents and the mass media, along with expressions of racist, xenophobic, and sexist views” (Pajnik, 2019, p. 23). Janša’s main international ally is the infamous long-standing far-right PM of Hungary, Victor Orbán, who “has been advising Janša and assisting his party financially” (ibid.). Using similar strategies as Orbán, SDP has been building a sizable media presence through connections to online portals that use language of fear and hate speech, including the infamous Nova24 portal and television station (see Vežjak, 2021). SDP has been exposed on several occasions for using astroturfing in order to spread fear mongering and hate (see Klarič, 2017; Boštic, 2021).

Employing inflammatory anti-immigration, homophobic and xenophobic rhetoric, members of SDP present themselves as victims of communist, “leftist-fascist”, “leftist-jihadist” and similar fictional conspiracies. For example, after the party experienced a disappointing result in the

2011 election, a text by a phantom figure called Tomaž Majer appeared in one of SDP-related media, stating that a massive turnout of 'non-Slovenian' voters with ex-Yugoslav accents enabled another politician to steal the victory from SDP and Janša" (Pajnik, 2019, p. 26).

During the same time, several factual pieces were written in the mainstream media on the connections between SDP and Slovenian neo-Nazi and white supremacy groups such as Blood&Honour, Headhunters Domžale, Slovenski Radikali, Tu Je Slovenija, Hervardi etc. (see Delić, 2011; Valenčič, 2010b; 2011; 2015). Although SDP denied such connections, publicly available records indicated, for example, that a member of the SDP youth faction was simultaneously a member of the racist group Blood&Honour, and that in 2005, when Janša was PM, the government allocated 500,000 Slovenian tolaars to Hervardi, an ultra-nationalist group with connections to anti-immigration vigilantes, for the preservation of their patriotic traditions, of course without mentioning their xenophobic and neo-racist attitudes towards ex-Yugoslav minorities and the Roma (Vezjak, 2015a, p. 168). As a consequence of these and similar facts being exposed publicly, a lawsuit against investigative journalist Anuška Delić was initiated in 2011 by the then director of the Slovenian security and intelligence service Sova, Damir Črnčec, who was one of Janša's most trusted and vocal supporters. Delić stood for trial in 2014 for allegedly publishing classified state information (see Nikolić, 2014) and was acquitted for lack of evidence. Nevertheless, Delić and Erik Valenčič, another investigative journalist who exposed these connections⁴ in a TV documentary (RTV SLO, 2015) and whom Janša reported to the CIA and called him a "potential terrorist" on Twitter (Roglič & Kramberger, 2015), have been threatened and put under all kinds of verbal attacks from various SDP-related online agents since then.

A quick overview of these agents' discourse finds the following interesting statements. An SDP politician speaking in parliament of a migrant who allegedly attacked a police officer said: "If they asked me, I would put a bullet in his head" (see Vezjak, 2019b). Sharing a Delo daily's analytical article on the RCC and diminishing numbers of Catholics, Janša tweeted that Delo is "competing for the official newspaper of the caliphate title" (see Vezjak, 2014). Janša's State Secretary for National Security, Žan Mahnič, recently posted a photo of young Caucasian girls with different hair colours on Twitter with the caption "This is all the diversity we need in Europe" (see Lebinger, 2020). Furthermore, the already mentioned Črnčec regularly tweeted and wrote columns on the alleged horrors of Islam, for instance: "The Arab who will work for 40 years in a car factory in Bavaria is a movie that doesn't exist, and we won't see it. Why did they even infect us with this cancer? In whose interest and how much did they get paid for it?". Etcetera - the SDP propaganda machine never stops.⁵

The second most prolific hate speech generators are politicians from the Slovenian National Party (SNP), particularly its long-time president Zmago Jelinčič. Basing all of its actions on Jelinčič's cult of personality, SNP is a small xenophobic far-right party that has never officially entered a governmental coalition within its three decades of existence. However, it does occasionally support them, like in the case of the current government lead by Janša. A pioneer of extreme nationalist and fascistoid rhetoric, Jelinčič has for a long time "advocated the purification of the Slovenian nation from Yugoslavs, migrants, gays and lesbians, and so forth" (Pajnik, 2019, p. 23). Apart from Janša, he is arguably the only politician in Slovenia who

⁴ See the figure in Appendix 3 for a simplified visual depiction of these connections.

⁵ See Appendix 2 for additional SDP and other politicians' quotes related to (de-)radicalisation.

managed to remain popular for such a long time, despite the SNP not entering the parliament on two separate occasions.

SNP has practiced a kind of left-right populism for most of its existence, combining blatant xenophobia and racism against the Roma minority with criticism of the Roman Catholic Church and the celebration of the WWII communist-led partisan resistance movement (see Hadalin, 2020, pp. 191-192). Despite some efficient collective PR stunts pulled by SNP politicians (for instance, illegally smuggling pistols into the parliament building and posing with them for a tabloid photoshoot; see MMC, 2005), one could say that the only constant of the SNP is its leader, Jelinčič.

Vežjak (2008b, p. 400) observes, that Jelinčič is described as a fascist and radical right-winger in foreign media much more frequently than in local media. In Slovenia, he is often considered a rowdy clown, getting regular invites onto news and entertainment shows, where he is allowed to share his extreme views without hindrance. For instance, in 2006, on the popular debate TV show *Piramida* on RTV Slovenija, in which a producer invited Jelinčič to compete against a municipal Roma representative, he won the competition with the help of viewers' votes by flaunting racist statements and complete fabrications about the Roma. Namely, that the Roma (whom Jelinčič always pejoratively refers to as Gypsies) lie, that apart from judges and prosecutors they are the only group in Slovenia with complete immunity from prosecution, that all of Slovenia is under their influence and that they do nothing but harm. After the show, Jelinčič was accused of and prosecuted for spreading hatred but the court acquitted him, while RTV Slovenia distanced itself from the content of the show, banned its rerun and denied Jelinčič to appear in the semi-finals (see Vežjak, 2008b, p. 93; Furlan-Rus, 2011). Jelinčič's use of insulting and prejudicial discourse and hate speech in Slovenian media is common. He can always count on a platform, even if he compares refugees to rabble (see Vežjak, 2015b) or assures viewers that there would be order in the country, if only he could put some people in front of a wall and shoot them (see Vežjak, 2019a). Such promotion of taking the law into one's own hands and violent vigilance does not always fall on deaf ears.⁶

In the last two decades, there have been instances of violent attacks against members of minorities lead by organised groups, which could arguably be characterised as extremist attacks at least, if not terrorist attacks, but have been perceived as something else by the police, prosecutors, courts, politicians, media and the general public. A description of four separate attacks lead by organised groups, whose obvious goal was to inflict severe physical harm on minority persons, follows below.

In May 2005, in an attack on a Roma dwelling in the Brezje settlement with a M52-P3 hand grenade, a Roma woman sustained injuries to her stomach from the bomb's shrapnel. A month later, in June 2005, a hand grenade was thrown from a car into a Roma family home in the Dobruška Vas village, resulting in the murder of two women, a mother and her daughter (see U.S. Dept. of State, 2007). Several men were arrested in relation to both crimes. After a lengthy trial with several convictions, some lengthy sentences and several acquittals, a final acquittal was handed down to all persons arrested, except for one person who was convicted to 10 years in prison for throwing the grenade in the Brezje case. The Dobruška Vas village case has not been solved at all until this day (see Furlan-Rus, 2020).

⁶ See Appendix 2 for more statements from politicians on (de-)radicalisation in Slovenia.

In June 2009, a group of masked young men armed with stones and torches, described as neo-Nazis by journalist Valenčič and an eyewitness, attacked the LGBTQ+ place Cafe Open and physically injured a gay activist (Valenčič, 2010b). The attackers were put to trial, triggering a protest by extremists in support of the attackers (see 24ur, 2010). They were initially convicted and acquitted thereafter. Regarding the acquittal, the attacked gay activist said that justice would never be served, but “since the attackers had admitted guilt in the mediation process, in moral terms they will forever remain persons who carried out an organised homophobic attack out of hatred of homosexuals” (see Ma, 2014).

In November 2019, at 6 am, after the place closed for the public, a group of right-wing thugs attacked the Tiffany gay club in Ljubljana. The attackers broke down the front door and entered the building, which also houses the Monokel lesbian club. The club staff took refuge and barricaded themselves behind one of the doors inside. The assailants smashed hallways, broke windows, banged on doors and yelled “Where are you pussies?” and “Come out, faggots!”. The police were notified immediately, but the attackers fled upon their arrival.

Apart from a few journalistic (RTV SLO, 2014), blogger (Vladoz lom, 2020a; 2020b), and anthropological (Gregorčič, 1999; 2000) accounts of right-wing extremists, there are no analytical reports on such groups, their background and their recruitment strategies that we know of, let alone any in-depth research studies or public de-radicalisation programmes targeting them. When assessing these attacks, the Slovenian public is generally left with an impression that assailants are individual criminals rather than organised extremist groups. Their acts and motives are described by using everyday crime vocabulary rather than that of national security, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism discourse, although one might argue the latter could also be employed.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

There are various stakeholders involved in the de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts in Slovenia,⁷ at least in terms of analysis of hate speech cases, as well as in terms of reflection on the prevention of possible future radicalisation of youth and other social groups, emphasising the possibility of terrorist threats. These stakeholders include the police, academic institutions, various scholars and journalists, awareness platforms etc. However, so far, Slovenia has neither put in place systemic preventive measures against radicalisation on the national level, nor has it implemented any models for early detection of radicalisation among young people (Vuga Bernšak & Prezelj 2020, p.58). In general, there is a lack of necessary understanding among decision and policy makers, that radicalisation is a multi-stakeholder rather than solely a security issue (see Prezelj et al., 2021). Slovenia also seems to be missing normative acts, that would enable preventive measures related to potential radicalisation of youth and boost the awareness of close relation between different sectors of society and radicalisation prevention policies (Vuga Bernšak & Prezelj 2020, p. 59).

Having said this, there have been obvious efforts in recent years by the Slovenian police and local security scholars to follow the EU directives in the field of de-radicalisation and to come

⁷ See Appendix 4 for main (de-)radicalisations programs in Slovenia.

up with proactive initiatives in order to strengthen local and regional de-radicalisation measures (see Prpič et al., 2018; Prislan et al., 2018). The Slovenian police show awareness and understanding of the EU's efforts through tackling the issue of radicalisation head on, including the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (adopted in 2005, revised in 2008 and 2014) and the 2017/541 Directive of the European Parliament and Council on combating terrorism and prevention of radicalisation (from 15. March 2017) (Prislan et al. 2018). Directing efforts towards combining criminal justice measures with policies in the fields of education, integration, social inclusion, rehabilitation and correction, security scholars and police practitioners are aware that fighting radicalisation and violent extremism involves more than surveillance and security (ibid., p. 261). In terms of practical solutions, they are placing emphasis on the deeper implementation of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) system locally. Bringing together security, grassroots and front-line de-radicalisation practitioners from across Europe, the European RAN programme was formed to help individuals who have already been radicalised or are vulnerable to radicalisation (ibid.).

Consequently, the establishment of the Slovenia-specific RAN-system was proposed on various occasions. For instance, police practitioners and experts in the ex-Yugoslav region have collaborated on the First Line project from 2014 to 2020, discussing the possibility of establishing national RAN-structures and raising awareness of radicalisation issues in the region (see Zajec & Černigoj, 2018). The project also supported activities of the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTI), a network of police experts led by Slovenia and formalized in 2011 under the auspices of the so-called *Brdo process*. The aim of the WBCTI initiative is to improve the exchange of information, introduce EU standards and provide support to the operational work of the police in the field of radicalisation. (ibid.)

Based on the analysis of the situation in Slovenia, a Slovenian RAN-model called RADCEPRO has recently been developed by Prezelj et al. (2021) and is awaiting possible implementation:

We were able to identify most of the relevant organisations that would be included in the proposed RAN-model at the strategic and operational level, and we also defined the principles according to which the Slovenian RAN-system should be designed. Representatives of the responsible institutions have now in their hands a substantial study and recommendations on how to build or upgrade the Slovenian system of identification and monitoring of radicalisation in the future. (Prezelj et al., 2021, pp. 254-255)

Furthermore, there are some additional scholarly efforts that should be acknowledged. For instance, the ongoing research project funded by the Ministry of the Interior and conducted by scholars from two Slovenian universities titled Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. As part of the research, a special issue of the *Šolsko Polje* journal was issued under the title Radicalisation, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity emphasising critical approaches to these issues (Sardoč & Deželan, 2018).

We cannot neglect Ljubljana's Mirovni Inštitut (Peace Institute), a left-wing scholarly NGO working extensively in the field of human rights protection and hate speech analysis with dozens of freely available online publications (used widely in this report as well). For example,

from 2000 to 2007, the Peace Institute organised the Intolerance Monitoring Group, which apart from analyses of and reports on various manifestations of intolerance, engaged in public discussions and other activities with the aim to promote the struggle against intolerance. Between 2015 and 2017, the institute financially supported a similar independent public body, namely the Council for Response to Hate and Discriminatory Speech, which monitored public discourse and wrote several reports on the issue of hate speech.

All of the above-mentioned projects have or will have been discontinued due to their reliability on European or national funding schemes, thus one cannot speak of a sustainable national de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programme in Slovenia. Nevertheless, one can mention several on-going efforts in the field of online hate speech, cyberbullying and harassment detection and awareness raising, such as online platforms Spletno-Oko.si and Odklikni.si, as well as blogs Vezjak.si (In Media Res), DanesJeNovDan.si, and Sovraštvo.si. Platforms Spletno-Oko.si and Odklikni.si have regularly been collaborating with the Ministry of the Interior and other relevant institutions, providing them with cases deserving of scrutiny from the authorities, while the mentioned blogs have occasionally collaborated with such institutions. These platforms and blogs, some of which are entirely privately run and others being publicly supported, are identifying and reporting on cyber-violence and hate speech from arguably progressive perspectives, while rarely discussing cases of left-wing hate speech or radicalisation, the latter being almost non-existent in Slovenia (which is obsessively disputed by SDP- and SNP-related agents, as formerly discussed).

It is worth noting that the scale of all the above-mentioned projects and programmes has been national rather than municipal, while the emphasis has been on police and civic education, public awareness and constructive criticism. Sustainable and on-going de-radicalisation programmes that focus on particular social groups seem to be non-existent in Slovenia at the moment. Nevertheless, important scholarly projects are currently striving to change this, accumulating a growing body of literature. However, a blind spot in literature on (de-)radicalisation produced by mainstream security and police scholars might arguably be the violent behaviour of Slovenian far-right, neo-Nazi and xenophobic vigilante groups which, although palpable, does not seem to play any relevant role in these writings. Conversely, when discussing radicalisation, the progressive and critical security scholars seem to lack any acknowledgment of at least the possibility of radicalisation of certain migrant and left-wing groups. However, one can argue that a concern for the wellbeing of youth is their common ground.

6. Conclusion

In this report, we aimed to present a brief overview and a short history of (de-)radicalisation events, stakeholders and agents in Slovenia. Slovenia is a very secure EU country in which no successful terrorist attack has been orchestrated thus far, provided that terrorism is understood in accordance with the currently prevailing international definition thereof. Security assessments do not predict such an attack taking place in the near future, but do not exclude it from happening altogether, thus Slovenia continues to follow EU counter-terrorist directives as a necessary precaution.

However, this does not indicate that Slovenian political elites do not resort to demonizing Muslims as terrorists, both in relation to the existing Islamic minority in Slovenia and to (future possible) immigrants arriving to Slovenia from Islamic countries. The biggest role of fear mongers is played by SDP and SNS politicians and their associated agents, who regularly use hate speech and incitement to violence on the brink of legality. This kind of discourse is peddled by an extensive network of seemingly unconnected right-wing media, which in reality are associated (mostly) with SDP, profusely targeting sexual minorities, Roma and migrants. So far, it has most sinisterly been developed during the so-called refugee crisis in autumn of 2015. Due to the history of the authoritarian prosecution of freedom of expression under socialism and other complex reasons, the Slovenian judiciary rarely sanctions agents of hate speech, ignoring the arguments of progressive scholars for stricter legislation on hate speech as preventive measures against hate crime.

Hence, we have indicated that organised violent attacks on various minorities, some of which resulted in deaths, have been present in Slovenia, while the police, politics, judiciaries and the general public do not perceive them as acts performed by radicals, extremists or terrorists. In terms of de-radicalisation, this report emphasises the lack of a sustainable national de- and counter-radicalisation programme. We also note that the Slovenian police and security scholars believe that the state needs a specific local RAN system modelled in line with the EU, which has already been developed, but is awaiting implementation. In addition, we draw attention to the programmes for monitoring intolerance, hate speech and human rights violations, run by progressive organisations within university or private initiatives.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Main (de-)radicalisation events in Slovenia since 2001

Name or a short description of the (de-) radicalisation event	Date or period of time	Description of significance
Dissolution of Yugoslavia and Balkan Wars and Slovenia's independence	1991-1995	Increased influx of migrants from the Balkans, rise in nationalistic attitudes towards ex-Yugoslav minorities.
Erasure	26.02.1992	Approximately 25,000 inhabitants of Slovenia, mostly members of ex-Yugoslav minorities, were illegally erased from the register of permanent residents by the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, they lost their legal status and related economic, health and social rights. In this regard, the Aliens Act came into force, after which they were treated as aliens residing in Slovenia illegally.
So-called Refugee Crisis (1st)	2001	Increased influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa brought about harsh public discourse on immigration.
Violent racist attack by skinheads against TV actor "Janez Belina" [John White]	02.07.2001	A popular TV character, Janez Belina, played by actor Inacio Bintchende, an immigrant from Guinea-Bissau was attacked at night by a group of racist skinheads in front of Sodček bar in Ljubljana's Trubarjeva cesta where they had their "headquarters" at the time (see https://www.mladina.si/93704/).
Protest against Janša's government	2012-2013	A massive uprising against the political elites at first and later against Janša's government. It started in the town of Maribor and soon spread throughout Slovenia. These were the largest protests in independent Slovenia.
Hand grenade attacks on two Roma homes	May and June 2005	Two hand grenade attacks in two months on two separate Roma homes in different villages, allegedly by the

		same group of attackers who were arrested shortly after. The attacks were not perceived as acts of terrorism.
Resettlement of the Roma family Strojan	2006	Lynch mobs “protected” the local population against members of the Roma family Strojan for several weeks, by preventing their return to their settlement and eventually, under state sponsorship, forcing them to resettle elsewhere (see MMC 2006; US Department of State 2007; Vezjak 2008a, pp. 58-59).
Piramida TV show with Zmagaj Jelinčič (SNP)	28.11.2006	Editors of Piramida competitive debate TV show matched far-right xenophobic politician, Zmagaj Jelinčič, against a municipal Roma representative. Jelinčič unleashes a torrent of prejudice and hate speech against the Roma.
Violent attack on Cafe Open, popular LGBTQ+ place	25.06.2009	A group of masked young men armed with stones and torches, described as neo-Nazis by journalist Valenčič (2010b) and an eyewitness, attacked the LGBTQ+ place Cafe Open and physically injured a gay activist. The attackers were initially convicted and then acquitted.
Coalition of Hatred part 1	2011	Investigative journalists Anuška Delić and Erik Valenčič publish several articles on the connection between the SDP party and far-right and neo-Nazi groups.
Coalition of Hatred part 2	2014	Erik Valenčič directs a TV documentary on far-right and neo-Nazi groups in Slovenia and their relationship to right-wing political parties.
So-called Refugee Crisis (2nd)	2015-2016	Increased influx of migrants from the Middle East, Humanitarian Corridor, Razor-Wire Fence on SLO-CRO border, increase in Islamophobia and hate speech and public xenophobic protests in various town across Slovenia.

Establishment of WBCTI	2015	The Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative (WBCTi) is an EU-supported effort to respond to the developments related to Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Radicalisation phenomena in the Western Balkans.
TV show Tarča (Target) with Zmago Jelinčič (SNP)	07.03.2019	Jelinčič was one of approximately a dozen guests in the studio. He claimed that he would make order in Slovenia in no time if he would be allowed to place some people against a wall and shoot them.
Štajerska Varda, a paramilitary group patrols the border	2018-2020	Štajerska Varda, a far-right paramilitary group led by Andrej Šiško, once the leader of far-right group Hervardi, started patrolling the border area for migrants. In 2018, Šiško was sentenced to 8 months in prison for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order by publicly lining up members of Štajerska Varda. Nevertheless, the groups continued its "border controls", visited the President of the Republic, loudly occupied a police station in a small town and obtained their own show on a local TV station. In 2020, Parliament had to pass a revision of the law on state border control in order to prevent such groups from patrolling the border (see https://www.dnevnik.si/1042939893/slovenija/poslanci-sisku-slacijo-maskirno-uniformo)
Ljubljana Mosque opens after 50 years of failed attempts for the construction of a mosque	19.09.2019	After 50 years of attempts to build a proper mosque in Ljubljana, the Muslim community finally manages to open it.
Violent group attack on Club Tiffany, popular LGBTQ+ place	October 2019	At 6 am, after the place closed, a group of right-wing thugs attacked the Tiffany gay club in Ljubljana. The club staff took refuge and barricaded themselves behind a door. The assailants broke windows and yelled "Come out, faggots!" The police were notified immediately, but the attackers fled upon

		their arrival.
National Strategy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism is adopted	December 2019	In addition to the National Coordinator for Terrorism, it also envisages the establishment of a National Coordinator for Radicalisation. The latter was appointed by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on 19 December 2019.

Appendix 2: Political discourse about radicalisation in Slovenia since 2001

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
<p>“The only ones who have immunity in Slovenia are first and foremost judges, secondly prosecutors and thirdly Gypsies. These are people who have absolute immunity, who have no obligations. These are allowed to steal and have 180 criminal charges each. (...) It's obvious that Gypsies are lying.”</p>	Zmago Jelinčič, MP, SNP	28.01.2006	YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZjkNz4xfLc	TV show Piramida
<p>“According to the latest information from verified Delo's sources, @Delo is running for the official newspaper of the caliphate”</p>	Janez Janša, current PM, then MP, SDP	27.08.2014	Twitter https://twitter.com/JJansaSDS/status/504515095301718016	Tweet about the largest daily newspaper in Slovenia
<p>“Calm down! Deportation is the only cure! This is a message for illegal migrants protesting in LJ today!”</p>	Damir Črnčec, former director of intelligence service; future Secretary of State for National Security in Marjan Šarec's government (2018-2020)	19.09.2016	Twitter https://twitter.com/DamirCrncec/status/777867197242871809	An expert on counterterrorism, Črnčec, PhD, has been an avid columnist and Twitter user and a key advocate for Janša's release from prison in 2014. He has often been accused of racism, Islamophobia and xenophobia


<p>“On a FB page of a public house [brothel] they offer cheap services of retired prostitutes Evgenija C and Mojca PŠ. One for € 30, the other for € 35. #ZvodnikMilan [#PimpMilan]”</p>	<p>Janez Janša, current PM; then MP, SDP</p>	<p>21.03.2016</p>	<p>Dnevnik https://www.dnevnik.si/1042944249</p>	<p>Regarding female journalists on public TV; In Slovenian, "public house" can mean public RTV or brothel. Hashtag PimpMilan Kučan, former Communist and president of Slovenia</p>
<p>“That is radical Islam. And radical Islam is like cancer. Hence, we need to move a little into medicine. (...) Therefore, it is necessary to stop importing migrants, to say goodbye to radical Islam forever. (...) [The change of legislation will not be necessary if the rest is done, what a normal government, such as Orban in Hungary, should do.”</p>	<p>Branko Grims, MP, SDP</p>	<p>25.05.2017</p>	<p>In Media Res https://veziak.com/2018/12/15/remier-ki-menda-obcuduje-hitlerja/</p>	<p>On national public TV about migrants and medical solutions for radical Islam</p>
<p>“Illegal migrants who enter Slovenia on a daily basis are a major security problem. They are organised violent criminals, bringing with them unknown viruses, scabies and similar diseases. The security situation in SLO is slowly changing in a negative direction. Decisive and clear action is needed!”</p>	<p>Damir Črnčec, former director of intelligence service; future Secretary of State for National Security in Marjan Šarec’s government (2018-2020)</p>	<p>07.06.2018</p>	<p>In Media Res, https://veziak.com/2019/06/02/dvojni-paktenacenostic-crncec-vztraja-pri-svojih-tvitih-in-zapisih-obeguncih/</p>	<p>A tweet. When Črnčec became the Secretary of State for National Security, he publicly stated that he still agrees with these tweets</p>

<p>“[Retweet] Accepting Muslims is, according to the pope, our “moral duty,” while the death penalty for a Catholic woman in Pakistan is “a matter of Pakistani domestic politics”. Hypocrite!”</p>	<p>Žan Mahnič, current Secretary of State for National Security, then MP SDP</p>	<p>21.12.2018</p>	<p>In Media Res https://veziak.com/2020/03/15/skrajna-desnica-v-sloveniji-nacionalna-varnost-v-casuzana-mahnica/</p>	<p>Retweeting a tweet of the far-right group Generacija Identitete Slovenia [Generation Identity]</p>
<p>“Until we place about three guys in front of the wall and shoot them, there will be nothing. (...) I would shoot them, you know. There would be immediate order throughout the country.”</p>	<p>Zmago Jelinčič, MP, SNP</p>	<p>07.03.2019</p>	<p>YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePinlTTnARk</p>	<p>TV Show Tarča (Target)</p>
<p>“What is happening now is that in Italy he [migrant] wounded a taxi driver with a knife, a police officer shot him in the leg, I find it strange that he was not charged by the policemen themselves. If they asked me, I would put a bullet in his head.”</p>	<p>Dušan Šiško MP, SDP, Director of Handball Club Krško</p>	<p>15.07.2019</p>	<p><u>Slovenske Novice</u> https://www.slovenskenovice.si/novice/slovenija/video-poslanec-jaz-bi-mudal-sus-v-glavo/</p>	<p>Meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs</p>
<p>“The massacre in Srebrenica would not have taken place if the territory of the former Yugoslavia had been cleansed of communist</p>	<p>Janez Janša, PM, SDP</p>	<p>11.07.2020</p>	<p>Dnevnik https://www.dnevnik.si/1042944249</p>	<p>Blaming communist ideology for genocide in Srebrenica, Janša tweets this on the 25th anniversary of the massacre.</p>

ideology after its disintegration and the post-war massacres in Slovenia and elsewhere condemned. #Srebrenica25”				
“We respect the difficult and tragic personal life of @JoeBiden and some of his political achievements years ago. But today, if elected, he would be one of the weakest presidents in history. When a free world desperately needs STRONG #US as never before. Go, win, @realDonaldTrump uss1”	Janez Janša, PM, SDP	23.10.2020	Dnevnik https://www.dnevnik.si/1042944249	A tweet: Janša rooting for a strong, not weak US president
“It’s pretty clear that American people have elected @realDonaldTrump @Mike_Pence for #4moreyears. More delays and facts denying from #MSM, bigger the final triumph for #POTUS. Congratulations @GOP for strong results across the #US @idualliance”	Janez Janša, PM, SDP	04.11.2020	EuroNews https://www.euronews.com/2020/11/04/slovenian-prime-minister-janez-jansa-congratulates-donald-trump-despite-no-election-result	A tweet: PM Janša congratulates Trump on victory before votes are officially counted

<p>“[Retweet about the Communist Manifesto] No other book has caused more death, suffering, impoverishment, and social backwardness except the Qur’an.”</p>	<p>Janez Janša, PM, SDP</p>	<p>21.02.2021</p>	<p>24ur https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/islamska-skupnost-v-sloveniji-kriticna-do-jansevega-deljenja-tvita-o-koranu.html</p>	<p>Janša retweets about Quran being worse than the Communist Manifesto</p>
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Appendix 3: Networks of radicalisation in Slovenia since 2001



Appendix 4: Main de-radicalisations programmes in Slovenia since 2001

Name of the de-radicalisation programme	Dates	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
Intolerance Monitoring Group	2000-2007	Mirovni Inštitut (Peace Institute)	educative, awareness raising on issues of hate speech and discrimination	national	General public
Spletno Oko [Web Eye], Centre for safer internet	2007-today	Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ljubljana, Ministry of the Interior	Awareness, education, reporting on child sexual abuse and exploitation detection & hate speech detection	national	General public
RAN Slovenia, a national RAN platform	2015-today	Police, Ministry of the Interior, EU	awareness, collaboration with various stakeholders in prevention of radicalisation, terrorism, violent extremism	national, regional	Various front-line institutions such as schools and hospitals
Svet za odziv na sovražni in diskriminatorni govor (Council for Response to Hate and Discriminatory Speech)	2015-2017	Mirovni Inštitut (Peace Institute)	educative, awareness raising on issues of hate speech and discrimination	national	General public
Western Balkan Counter Terrorism Initiative (WBCTI)	2015-today	Police, Ministry of the Interior	awareness, regional collaboration in prevention of radicalisation, terrorism, violent extremism	regional	General public

Oddelek za terorizem ekstremno nasilje in terorizem v Upravi kriminalistične policije [Department for Terrorism and Extreme Violence at the Slovenian Criminal Police Directorate]	2003-today	Police, Ministry of the Interior	policing	national	General public
In Media Res (vezjak.si)	2005-today	Private blog by scholar Boris Vezjak	educative, awareness raising on issues of hate speech, discriminatory discourse etc.	national	General public
Odklikni (odklikni.si)	2014-today	Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities	educative, awareness raising, reporting cyberbullying and harassment of women and girls	national	General public
Sovraštvo (sovraštvo.si)	2018-today	Zavod Državljan D [Association Citizen D]	educative, awareness raising on issues of hate speech in media; campaigning against advertising in media using hate speech	national	General public

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